Continuum arguments

One type of Continuum argument used by the science of superimmortality and the ixperiencit theory of consciousness is the continuum of experiments argument

Lets consider several continuum experiments. The first one is where there is a time period between death of a person and the restoration of identical pre-death structure and functioning of their body. It is helpful to have a scientific definition of death of a person. It frequently means a permanent end of a person's conscious life produced by their body. We can imagine the situation where through science and technology the structure and functioning of the body is restored to the healthy pre-death state like existed before a fatal accident like drowning. People do come back to life after short periods of not breathing and the colder the water the less damage to the body thus the longer they can go with out oxygen. In these cases there is no restoration of the structure and functioning of the body because there has not been enough damage to the body to need restoration except for starting the heart beating and supplying oxygen to the lungs again. Most people in this case would believe that this person has the same ixperiencitness as it had before But enough change have occurred to their environment of this person that they likely will not be producing the same consciousness that they did before the accident. Now we can imagine experiments where there are increasingly longer periods of the body being dead --- not breathing, no heart beat, no consciousness being produced. To begin with maybe only small amounts of restoration are needed to the body to restore the same structure and functioning as existed before death. If the degradation is stopped at this point, does it matter how long the body stays in this state before it is restored to the original state of structure and functioning? It does matter to the individual if the body no longer produces the same ixperiencitness because if the body does not produce the same ixperiencitness the original person by definition does not experience the consciousness produced by this restored body. The independent variable is the length of time that the body did not produce any consciousness and ixperiencitness and the dependent variable is which ixperiencitness is produced at the restoration of the body's functioning. Most people would assume that the time period would not matter so each experiment with an incremental longer period of being dead would not matter. There would be no point where the ixperiencitness would change. This would be a simpler explanation than trying to explain why there would be a change in the ixperiencitness, where in the sequence of continuum experiments, would be this change, and to which other ixperiencitness, and why this one and no other one.

We can now change the experiment to a different independent variable it is no longer the time of death but the amount of degradation of the body. Each experiment in the continuum sequence has slightly more degradation than the previous one. The first experiment has such a small degree of degradation that upon restoration it has the same ixperiencitness as before the accident. Each progressive experiment has more degradation than the previous one that is restored to the original structure and functioning of the body. The question is as the degree of degradation increases what happens to the ixperiencitness upon restoration? Is there going to be a sharp change in the ixperiencitness at some point in the sequence of experiments? Or will there be a gradual change in the ixperiencitness with each increasing difficult restoration? The simplest prediction is that at all stages of the continuum sequence of experiments the same ixperiencitness will be produced. One might point out that there is another simple explanation and this is that no ixperiencitness is eventually produced. The questions then become why does a person that acts like they are alive and conscious not have an ixperiencitness? And why at a certain point along the continuum sequence of experiments and no other point between experiments is this dividing line produced. Between any two continuum experiments another one can be created so that it is between the two. If the ixperiencitness changes or no longer exists from one experiment to the next, we can see what happens at this in between experiment.

The independent variable is the time interval and the dependent variable are resulting consciousness and ixperiencitness.

We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the degree of restoration varies toward becoming identical to a previous point in one's lifetime.
We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments, where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the degree of restoration varies toward becoming identical to a future point in one's life.
We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments, where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the degree of restoration varies toward becoming identical to a past divergent point in one's life.
We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the degree of restoration varies toward the structure and functioning of someone with a totally different ixperiencitness.
We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the degree of restoration varies toward the structure and functioning of someone with a partially different ixperiencitness.

We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the amount of originals body's matter in the restored body varies.
We can consider restoration after death continuum experiments where the time between death and restoration is the same, but the arrangement of identical atoms and molecules in originals body's is varied in the restored body.