First Rational Experiment Argument Part 2

Fourth possibility (divergent normal consciousness argument)

The Fourth possibility is that the cidentireplica is conscious, about the same level of complexity as the original but the consciousness is totally different from that of the original. Because of arguments against possibility 2 and 3, we can eliminate extremes in divergence in complexity of consciousness in the cidentireplica. We thus have a band of complexity of consciousness within limited bounds around the originals consciousness. This consciousness is, as or more different than two strangers with different lives and body structures, but it corresponds to this reality and has a relatively normal psychology. It is a difference that we can relate to. It is a consciousness based on a reality of trees water, television, dreams, love, children, pain, etc. This possibility is not likely because of the identical functioning of the original’s and cidentireplica’s brains. The cidentireplica will always give the impression of having the same consciousness as the original because he will be behaving exactly like the original. Because of the “identical sf produces identical behavior argument” What would make the original and cidentireplica have this much difference in their consciousnesses, yet, describe themselves having the same consciousness? When the original and the cidentireplica are asked any same sequence of questions they will always respond the same. If the cidentireplica does not respond the same he is not a cidentireplica of the original by definition. The answers to any questions that are asked about the cidentireplica’s consciousness, to the cidentireplica, will be exactly the same as the original’s answers. Since in this case the cidentireplica is conscious he will be hearing his answers to the questions and processing these answers into his view of reality. If the answers to the questions are not what he is really feeling or conscious of there will be an awareness of it. An example of this is the original is asked “What do you feel?” he says, “I feel pain.” The cidentireplica asked the same question says “I feel pain.” but because his consciousness is different does not in fact feel pain. He is conscious that he said he felt pain (because he can hear his response). This will produce a paradox in his mind “Why am I thinking and feeling one thing and saying and/or doing another? Do I really control my speech -- body or not?” If his consciousness actually the functioning of the brain, sooner or later the cidentireplica will respond or behave differently than the original because his behavior is not corresponding to his feelings, desires, needs, emotions, beliefs, memories, ---- how he thinks that he should or wants to behave. And when this happens he is obviously not a cidentireplica. I will call this concept “The paradox of the consciously different (from the original) but identically behaving and functioning cidentireplica” -- cidentireplica paradox or Cid paradox for short. -- (Self awareness of behavior and consciousness argument) If consciousness controls behavior, or if consciousness corresponds to or is the behavior of the nervous system and two consciousness are different enough their behavior will eventually diverge. It is a paradox if this does not happen.

If the divergence of consciousness carries out to a difference in behavior such as the cidentireplica saying that he is not in pain but the original saying he is, we can trace this change back in time through the muscles moving differently in the mouths vocal cords to the nerves firing differently that stimulate these mouth muscles. At some point before this overt behavior of speech there has to be a first difference between the functioning of the cidentireplica and that of the original because they are identically functioning at one point. What caused this divergence and what was the consciousness before this point of divergence? It does not take a little change in the functioning of the brain to say that the individual is in pain or not so the difference of functioning either has an external source of change or a slow progressional internal source of change. Since before the change in external behavior that the resolved cid paradox would produce, there has to be a change in the functioning in the nervous system that produces the change to this external behavior. Scientifically, the brain will have to be functioning differently for this change in consciousness to be occurring before the change in external behavior. If it is not then there has to be some non materialistic reason for it happening. But our theory is based on scientific materialism which would eliminate this possibility without considerable experimental and logical proof, and that proof does not exist.

An unresolved cid paradox could lead a normal conscious person to psychosis but not psychotic behavior in a cidentireplica unless the original produced psychotic behavior. You may get used to the fact that your body does not properly respond to your conscious commands especially if you grew up this way.

If the cid paradox exists, what has to be explained is why the cidentireplica’s conscious mind cannot control his body, but the original can or thinks that he can control his body. And why the cidentireplica has that particular consciousness that produces the cid paradox rather than any other possible one? Specifically, why these particular thoughts, feeling, memories, etc. and not any other ones? This again makes for a more complex theory that we have no reason to accept based on what the scientific evidence is.

There is also the logical nature of consciousness where it is usually based on observable physical aspects of the body. If your stomach is full of food, you will feel full. If you have the flu you will feel sick. If you got burned you will feel a burning sensation. There are many physical aspects of your body that can be externally observed with their corresponding feeling and sensation that should go with them. To postulate that the cidentireplica will actually be hungry when he just ate a very big meal and his stomach is full is not a likely consciousness for the cidentireplica if the original says that he is full. Why would the original say that he is full and actually experience being full where as the cidentireplica says he is full with a full stomach and actually experience a different aspect of consciousness i.e., that of being hungry? Normally people experience hunger when they have not eaten for long enough periods of time. Why would the cidentireplicas be different from other people in this sense and any or ever other cases that can be externally observed? The most likely consciousness of the cidentireplica will be a consciousness that is very much like that of the original just because of the nature of human bodies. (This is called the normalcy argument) mapping of physical aspects of the body to mental aspects produced by the body.

Another problem is if there is no scientifically discernible difference between the cidentireplica and its original and yet there is a difference between their consciousnesses, and there is not a scientific way of relating the change in matter, space and/or time, to the change in consciousness, we have lost our ability to determine scientific information about how the brain produces consciousness. This is because there will be no way to scientifically explain and predict the changes in consciousness based on physical differences between the original and cidentireplica because there would be none. We would not be able to explain or predict the consciousness of the cidentireplica, nor the originals either. If we could correlate the functioning of the original’s brain with a certain consciousness it would only be good for that particular original and only on weak inductive grounds. An example of this is the case of mixing baking soda and vinegar. What happens is you get fizzing because you get a gas by product. But what happens if the first time you do the experiment you get the fizzing gas but the second time with all variables the same you do not get fizzing you get a blue solution. Then the third experiment nothing happens. The fourth experiment you have an explosion like a firecracker. The fifth experiment you have made a plastic. The sixth experiment you have created a lizard. If this was the case, we could not predict what the next mixing will bring. Will it bring one of the first six results or will it be something entirely new? (Duplicatability of natural Scientific experiments argument).

Duplicatability is the basis for science and technology. Imagine if there is no duplicatability in nature: we make an exact copy to an original workable computer but it does not work. The next exact copy #2 is not like the previous two so it has to work, but differently than the first two copies of the computer for instance 2+2 =3, green for the original computer is now blue for copy #2. If this is the case computers would be worthless. The original is the first experiment as to what physical properties produce what consciousness. The cidentireplica is the second. In science if you did an experiment once and carefully redid the experiment again keeping all the variables the same, if you had to make a prediction on what the outcome would be for the second experiment before it happened, you would predict that it would be the same outcome as the first experiment. If the results in the second experiment were different from the results in the first you ask what was there different in the second experiment to produce this difference? (Scientific prediction through induction argument)

Fifth possibility

Explain the problem Explain the empirical argument of that abnormal structure and functioning of the brain produces abnormal consciousness normal structure and functioning produces normal consciousness. If the original has abnormal structure and or functioning then there should be abnormal consciousness produced in the cidentireplica. If not abnormal functioning and structure in the original then there should be normal consciousness produced in the cidentireplica

Fifth possibility (insane, crazy) The consciousness that the cidentireplica produces, in this possibility is out of touch with reality or sense experience to some degree. It could be called totally psychotic or swinging between normalcy and periods of psychosis. This means that it is producing a consciousness that is in various ways not connected to reality or produces a conscious reality that is disjointed etc. This is different from a cid paradox, but could be the result of the cid paradox that is not resolved. We know through scientific research that a brain that does not function within certain parameters has difficulty fitting into society, being happy, behaving normally, essentially it has psychological problems. Many bizarre types of consciousness fits into this category. Crazy or bizarre consciousnesses corresponds to bizarre, crazy, or abnormal behavior and abnormal brain functioning and structure. We know that deviant behavior corresponds to abnormalities in brain functioning. produces differences in brain functioning from not non deviant behavior. Deviant brain functioning produces deviant behavior argument (Deviant behavior argument)(Abnormal functioning abnormal consciousness argument) The cid paradox will not necessarily cause a problem here if you already have sufficient enough psychological problems your body behaving and communicating differently than you want it to may seem normal or seem like part of the psychosis. Enough crazy thoughts will eventually produce crazy behavior. If we consider that the crazy thoughts are totally disconnected from the behavior so that crazy external behavior never occurs, what consciousness do we have connected to the behavior, that is corresponding to or producing the behavior of the original? The brain could input the sense information like the original does. Because the consciousness is crazy it does not matter how the sense information effects the consciousness. But for a crazy (disconnected, disjointed disorganized, incoherent, or illogical) consciousness to produce no change in behavior there would have to be no effect of consciousness on the working of the neurons. We consequently, have a case of epiphenomenalism but we made the stipulation of scientific materialism--- consciousness is produced by the functioning and structure of the neurons.

There are three possibilities: 1. The original can be crazy and the cidentireplica can be normal. 2. The original can be normal and the cidentireplica’s consciousness is crazy (abnormal). 3. The consciousness of the original is abnormal and the cidentireplica is different and abnormal also.

First experiment predictor argument

The original can be considered the first experiment of what happens under a certain set of conditions or circumstances. It is a scientific concept that if we duplicate all the conditions that goes to produce the consequence of an experiment exactly we will get the same results. Usually for an experiment all the original conditions are not necessary to get the same result. For most experiments time, space, and the identical matter have changed from one experiment to the next. Consequently, these conditions can change and you get the same results. The original is an experiment the consciousness produced by the original is one of the results. The cidentireplica can be considered the second experiment.

Most scientific experiments are based on the assumption that space, time, and the replacement of matter and energy with identical matter and energy will create the same results for an experiment.

If you had to make a choice of all the possible results of an experiment given the results of the first experiment and knowing that all of the determining factors are identical, the most reasonable prediction would be that the results will be the same as in the first experiment. If you do the second experiment and find that the results are not the same there has to be a determining factor that is different. First experiment predictor argument applies to all of the nine possibilities

Experimental conditions of importance argument

Experiments have shown over and over materialistic conditions that apply and ones that do not apply. For chemical experiments temperature, pressure, the types and amount of different chemicals and elements used, the degree of mixing, structure of those elements, type and amount of radiation are some of the controlling and determining factors. What conditions can you change in an experiment and not change the results? In other words what physical conditions can you change and still have the same results? Change in place, time and identical elements, molecules -- certain properties of matter

If the cidentireplica does not have identical consciousness as does the original then you have a controlling factor that is not identical

By purposing that a cidentireplica is producing the consciousness of the original we are not purposing that it can not be part of some other consciousnesses or be producing one or more separate consciousness. So we do not have to prove that identical consciousness is the only consciousness that is produced.