Identical memories argument

Identical memories argument is the argument for multiplicity and superimmortality that:

Identity of structure and functioning of the body produces identical memories.
Closely identical of structure and functioning of the body produces identical memories.
Some structures and functionings of the body can produce some of the same memories as the original.
If a structure and functioning of a body never produces a a particular then an identical structure and functionign body will also never produce that memory
There are other structures and functioning bodies that will never produce a certain memory.
By the one of several different patterns of manipulation of the structure and functioning of a brain any memory can be produced by a brain with out the body ever actually experiencing the events that will produce the memory.
The same event (sensesection) can produce different memories in different bodies (physapaths).

Evidence with experiments:

Identity experiments: experiments with cidentireplicas having the same memories as the original

Identity experiments with varying question making divergence Cidentireplicas diverging into videntireplicas because of a variation of questions Cases where videntireplica having a better memory of an actual event than the cidentireplica has Identity experiments with varying environments making divergence

Slight difference in identity experiments

The continuum of slight difference in identity experiments

Variation of memories with variations of structure and functioning.

Determining variety of memories with variations in structure and functioning of the brain

Proof with logic:

Identical structure and functioning of a body produces identical behavior, so a cidentireplica of any original can give evidence of having the same memories through producing information about the memories of the original. This information can be presented in many different ways such as verbally, written in any language, sign languages or even producing physical representation or even recreations of the event that produce the memory in the first place. What will it take for the cidentireplica not to have the same memories as the original has even though the evidence is against this hypothesis? For example the original gives a good verbal description of the event that produce the memory the cidentireplica will give the exact same description. The cidentireplica can be asked if he really believes that he had this experience. He will give the exact same answer that the original does.